Beyond the Interdisciplinary: The State of Body Studies in their ‘Hereness’

“Here I am
Trying to kill time
Playing
cards, dominoes, basketball
in this recreation yard
Surrounded by thick, high walls
And steel meshes like a roof…”

[“Aquí estoy
tratando de matar el tiempo
jugando
baraja, dominó, basketball
en este patio de recreo
cubierto por gruesas y altas paredes
y mallas de acero como techo”]

Alberto Mendoza, prisoner in Marin County
California, 1992.¹

In the beginning…
The body is defined as a kind of extension of space, where cultural normalization takes place, and simultaneously, the body is located at the core of current

¹ These verses were written under the double experience of social closure of his author, on the one hand, his biography is one of exclusions and inclusions. Alberto Mendoza was an Spanish-speaking male, a Latino, former member of the guerrilla from El Salvador in the 70’s, he also experienced political exile and activism as member of the refugee community in a Canadian city, turned years later into a church-robber on the Californian coast. Alberto Mendoza, the prisoner-poet, in his condition of immigrant condemned to death at the start of the 90’s, wrote to kill time: “without a future, or rather [...] detained in the regime of an all too certain future, that would suddenly be upon him [...]” (Ramos 1996, 37-38).
critical scholarship, revealing a wide range of practical and theoretical interrelations that are represented by terms such as embodiment, bodily experiences, and others that are sometimes redundant or confusing. In recent years, our understanding of the human body has transformed rapidly, not only because of media and public discourse, but also our daily experiences and concerns about ours/others bodies have been transformed along with an increasing sense of the existential vulnerabilities.

The body is no longer what it used to be. Present scholarship has focused on an elemental notion of the body, which overcomes binary representations and invites us to think about the range of bodies that circulate and are present within social life. Current focus on the human body emphasizes the inseparability of mind and body (at least until death), and on the sociological perspective of the body, which emphasizes the body as a “holograph” into which social relations are carved, where the social and the psychic are bounded together in an epidermal unit.¹

Certainly, holistic views of the body are not incompatible with current scientific discourses, which question hierarchical mind/body divides (this includes current neuroscientific research, philosophies of psychology, and the various epistemic ruptures science has faced from biopolitical, feminist, queer, postcolonial, and decolonizing critics, who are engaged in the complex movement of trans/interdisciplinary spaces such as affect and body studies, performance and art studies, memory studies, phenomenological anthropology, post-ontological philosophies, and more recent theological and speculative turns, among many others.) In an interesting move, some readings on the body examine the body’s contemporary cultural forms of legibility, in which the objectified body assumes different appearances and roles according to its greater or lesser public visibility. There are still not visible bodies, or not fully visible, such is the extreme case of ‘unwitnessed’ deaths (Missing bodies in diverse times and places).

Originating from the very basic possibility of the visible body, the “politics of visibility” (Casper and Moore 2009), in addressing the enormous range of bodies on the planet, means that one could imagine millions of images, hagiographies, radiographies, illustrations and representations of bodies, as well as

¹ Amongst the wide variety of recent theories on embodiment, one thing is clear: concepts of the body hinge on which side of knowledge-power matrix is emphasized. Even though she lacks a conception of the pre-linguistic and precognitive features of the body, which have been emphasized by more recent scholars, Elizabeth Grosz’ foundational definition still emphasizes that the human body: “[...] coincides with the ‘shape’ and space of a psyche, a body whose epidermic surface bounds a psychical unit, a body which thereby defines the limits of experience and subjectivity [...] through the intervention of the other or symbolic order (language and rule-governed social order).” (Grosz 2002, 298)
not accurate amount of bodies, with proper name, without identity neither form, that figure in the memory of the recent past times. Or, bodies “whose absence is in accounted for and not remarked on in popular culture or by governments [...] such as.” (Casper and Moore 2009, 30)

Amongst the various attempts to prioritize the body, the one just discussed is less preoccupied with the search for abiding hidden meanings, than with a focus on the exploration of material surfaces and cultural forms. Here, the body appears as an emissary and witness together with other bodies, all of which derive their form directly out of their lived experiences. A long list of emergent bodies illuminate this matter: absent bodies, mingled bodies, bodies without organs, excluded bodies, transbodies, performing bodies, disabled bodies, unrecoverable bodies, bodies settled in motion, in transit, and so on.

There is no doubt that in the heart of social life, the body and its response to various situations stands as a metaphor and question for how we live our lives. Twenty years ago, the question of identity and bodily claims were viewed from within the paradigm of “dys-appareance\(^3\) and/or re-appearance” processes, which might expel subjects “from the social world, [throwing us] back on the limited world of our bodies” (Shilling 2003, 184). Over recent decades, we have witnessed a reappearance of the body, in new and different locations, as a consequence of heightened investigations into how we express and live our bodies (based on politics of sexuality, gender, disability and so forth). The re-emergence of the interest in the body has also signified a move “beyond” the limits of identity (the body is always referring to liminality), turning the question of the body into a meditation on resistances to normative culture. This is just one facet of long lasting work on the politics of bodies—not always with happy endings, but on the contrary often marked by processes of loss and suffering.

My interest moves across three domains: First, to examine embodied agency and embodiment, as illuminated by investigations of bodily experience beyond the classical structure of phenomenological thought (Husserl perspective). Secondly, to revise some of the approaches about the sensory abilities of the human body and multisensual experience, which challenge solipsistic representations of the body (those divided into a fivefold sensorial schema, or viewed by the gaze of an ocularcentric culture). And finally, moving towards my own interest,
to examine the scenes of the body which touch upon the theme of bodily projections.

It would be impossible to provide a stable definition of the body, for, as the title of my article suggests, the body is a process of hereness and nowness, not a static entity. Instead of a comprehensive literature review, I employ various terms and definitions of the body, the plurality of uses of bodies, and other concepts from a number of selected approaches and critical perspectives. I intend to draw out a few ramifications of the arboreal, transdisciplinary space inhabited by bodies in their state of being "here"—once again, as hereness. 4

In trying to follow this pathway, my attention is focused just on a few of the many implications of human, living bodies in the present era.

Taking account of the body

“The body warns”: it speaks of itself, recognizes its ailments and imbalances, feels the passage of time, warns us that it is ageing (says the feminist thinker Luce Irigaray). Our bodies serve as our homes because they are in us as much as we are in them. Corporeality 5 highlights the persistent communication between the exterior of the ego, the external world, and subjectivity, constantly performing

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4 This *State of Body Studies* is in relation with the dialogue the authors of this third edition of our journal *INTERdisciplina* have made possible. Special thanks to this collective of colleagues, partners, editors, translators, revisers, and designers for your patient work. Also my gratitude to Sonia Cejudo for doing the revision of this article, and to Jordan Osserman for the article’s English edition.

As our readers already noticed, this issue features a number of articles on bodies, some written with the purpose clarifying concepts in order to apply them to major research projects, others advancing research in process or parts of research already published. This present issue intends to add to our current agenda of providing research in other languages and other points of departure to think, rethink and make sense with, from and in the body. We hope you will agree with our focus on revisiting issues from a wide range of study: critics of traditional frames of cognition; non-conscious and nonverbal language and embodied experience; the power of the voice (and the listeners) in doing qualitative research with entanglement methodologies; the value of haptic cultures and the sense of touch; the anatomy of the racialized body; transsexuality and the pleasures generated by organizations in the lived world; transgender erotism; image and skin subjectivity, literary analysis of the spectrality in the Latin America narrative; the study of a Mexican novel from the body in pain, and reviews on three books on philosophy of body of Michel Serres (Spanish edition), *A reader of Sociology of the body*, edited by Claudia Malacrida and Jacqueline Low (English edition) and an Spanish version of a book of Shoshana Feldman on body, feminism and psychoanalysis.

5 Here, corporeality refers to the phenomenological meaning of incarnated body. At other points in this article, the corporeal has a stronger relation to living body its physical attributes. Sometimes I use corporality, instead with a sociological meaning: the body in the act, and able to enact. I endeavor to distinguish these different emphases throughout the article.
its dual social and biological role. Instead of prioritizing the visual and auditory senses over the others (hearing, smell, taste, touch)—as traditional body schemas typically do—the phenomenological approach stresses the dynamics of bodily encounters, and the intersubjectivity between one’s own living body and the corporeal body of the other. Therefore, this philosophical enterprise has incorporated a much more complex and nuanced use of the term corporeality, along with a variety of critiques that reject reifications of the body (as are present in notions of bodily substantiality (Heidegger), or the mistake of associating the incarnated body (Merleau-Ponty) with the Christian meaning of incarnation and creation ex nihilo).

Without a doubt, this re-emerging phenomenological body, as a knowledge-in-formation which intersects biology and neurosciences, psychoanalysis and history, and literary studies, has, in addition to creating new possibilities for visualizing the body, enhanced our world, creating connections to other bodies in its deeper understanding of the multiple ontogenesis of worlds of experiences. The French version of phenomenology is constituted by a corporealized understanding of memory, one that is inscribed both physically and psychologically into the self. The Poetics of Space (1975 [1958]) marks Gaston Bachelard’s convergence with phenomenology. Bachelard shows how we experience the presence of phenomena. His expanded notion of terms such as “interior space” (Bachelard 1975 [1958], 30) forces us to reexamine what really inhabits other spaces—not just those intimate and dwelling places.

Both Bachelard and Maurice Merleau-Ponty were influenced by Henri Bergson, but both were less concerned with knowing the world by direct and intuitive experience—especially Merleau-Ponty, who gave priority to an ego-perceptive body motivated by the I want and the I can, rather than reducing the subject to a rational ego. Merleau-Ponty shares much in common with the philosophy and psychology of Edmund Husserl, including the notion of the body as an area where all our experiences converge in relation to other animated bodies, notwithstanding the subject’s subsequent reflexive possibility of being present in the living world (Behnke and Ciocan 2012; Piérola 1977), which could be formulated alternatively as the change from the subject-body in itself to a subject-body for itself. Bachelard goes further than Bergson when he “spatialises the temporality of memory” and arrives at the idea that “memories are localised, materiality, [and] the materiality of lived place, is inscribed in our bodies”, something that sociologists such as the Australian Ann Game clarified when speaking about new ways for understanding embodied memory (Game 1996, 202).

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6 Here I refer to debates on the “humanimal” (Haraway, and others), affirmative biopolitics (Esposito), multiple ontologies (Viveiros de Castro), among others.
In the past few decades, the topic of the body has become important to scholars working on issues of cultural memory (Assman 1997), made apparent by the emphasis on “embodied memory”, a category that enables Aleida Assmann to explain the rehabilitation of memory as “against the ideal of objective and abstract history[ography]”, made by philosophers, sociologists and historians such as Nietzsche, Maurice Halbwachs, and Pierre Nora, among other theorists during a second polarizing stage of the memory-history relationship (Assman 2008, 59 and 60). The body relentlessly affirms the variability of human relations, with respect both to others’ bodies and the way the body is implicated in the construction of the self. Hence, the body/self represents a nexus through which knowledge, feeling and memory are intertwined.

Viewed from an embodied memory perspective, bodies are “carriers of memory [...] that share in collective images and narratives of the past, that practice mnemonic rituals, display an inherited habitus, and can draw on repertoires of explicit and implicit knowledge.” (Erll 2011, 12) They are knots in the structures of time (of information, consumption, circulation, and so on) that participate in contemporary political economy (Connerton 2009, 146), affecting the ways we look at traumatic events and how we read past sufferings. This is why the body appears as an elliptical concept that condenses the limits of social experiences, subjectivities and perceptions. This mobile, fluid interpretation of the body can also be found in concepts such as “affective histories” (the name Chakrabarty gave to his blurred and critical postcolonial posture),7 where a feeling body is understood as an emotional body, inseparable from the world of the passions [pathe], yet simultaneously possessing a consciousness which results from being in contact with the one’s state of place (again, as “hereness”). Many scholars have engaged in insightful debate on the connection between the body and emotionality, among them Martha Nussbaum. In Upheavals of Thought, for example, Nussbaum conducts a genealogical investigation into the feeling body and the presence of emotions in ethical and political thought, clarifying our understanding of role of emotions in subjectivity and the affective dimension of the subject. Unlike her last book, which focused on political emotions (2013), this former book demonstrates how emotions furnish our mental lives (Nussbaum 2001). For Nussbaum, an adequate definition of the ‘feeling body’ must include an emotional framework in which appears the sentient (body), affect

7 Following Dipesh Chakrabarty (2000), it was the hermeneutic tradition which “[produced] a loving grasp of detail in search of an understanding of the diversity of human life-worlds”. This also characterizes what he and Homi Babha called “affective histories” (Chakrabarty 2000, 18). In this sense, the historical perspective does amount to a mere channel of explanation, but represents a coexistence of the “practical and thinking experiences of the blurring sense of the analytical and hermeneutical.”
and affectations, emotions and feelings. Nussbaum's approach, however, depends on a basic identification with an object; otherwise feelings lose their meaning (fear, for example, is defined in relation to the object of fear). Without an object, feeling turns into sensation, like in "a hint of fear"—just a tremble, a free-floating disturbance. The sentient body depends on a sensory-perceptive process in which sensation expresses some minimal intention, judgment and perception, as in 'the sense of emptiness when someone is absent' (Nussbaum 2008, 49 and 83).

At the same time, the feeling body acquires a deeper meaning when viewed from what is understood classically as the performance of the body or the "language of the body," which is characterized by the combination of one's voice, one's style of speech and one's physical behaviour and which generates meaning in the eyes of the other. Here one might think not just of live voices (from public speeches that seek to connect emotionally with the audience to artistic practices in the performance arts), but also the recorded voice, since all of them seem "to posses the power to turn words into acts," as Mladen Dolar suggests. "The mere vocalization endows words with a ritual efficacy; the passage from articulation to vocalization is like a passage a l'acte, a passage to action and an exertion of authority" (Dolar 2006, 55). The human voice continues to appear as a great mystery. When words —in texts and in speech—are uttered, the voice that has spoken affects the whole body: organs, muscles, ligaments are in motion like an inner choreography with an outside potential. Voices generate pleasure, both when sounds enter the ear and when the musculature produces dict. For the subject, the body as "resonant materiality" foresees and forges subjectivity (Manning 2010, 118).

Considering the issues just posed, I suggest that the singularity of the body is linked to debates that sidestep classical figures of the social agent and "symbolic domination," those in which the subject, via misrecognition, works through and internalizes the *habitus*. (This conception is not exactly the same as our first definition of *habitus*, as a mimetical and cultural construction, given by Marcel Mauss in his essay on "Techniques of the body" (Mauss 1979 [1934])).

The idea that the social is "deposited" into each individual [or into collective identities] in the shape of lasting dispositions that are partially included in the *habitus* (Bourdieu 2000 [1984], 31) (and *habitual* body), suggests a phenomenon wherein the symbolic and social order behave as a virtual human in the subject's body, reproducing itself and reinstating its exclusionary mechanisms into new material and discursive social relations. In such a framework, the use of the word "in-corporations" sometimes serves to accent this Bourdieuan meaning, and the English word "embodiment" brings corporality into the picture.

Nevertheless, in my opinion, "to incorporate" admits of another important
meaning: when a person turns to his or her self and translates a bodily-perceived emotion (indignation, defiance, fear, resentment…) into a mechanism that “immunizes the submissive person against willing consent,” in order to be able to say “I give in”, “I’ll conform” (Scott 2000 [1990], 138). In this way, we can consider an experiential sphere (associated with intersubjectivity/intercorporeality, as we will see later) that accounts for resistances and changes in subjectivity, and, at the same time, we can examine such key issues as: In what way does mimesis constitute those human practices which renew, create and elaborate with different senses the past and habitual practices but also mimesis for contra-trajectories of hope and giving? How have categories related to the body been applied to examine the re-incorporations that take form and place in various localities and in virtual reality? Clearly the impact of the digital world has altered the roots of social life, so, how much has this transformation challenged the meanings of our incarnated language? Do concepts such as “second life”, “virtual bodies”, “avatars”, and so on, connect with the bodily experiences and socialities of the socially and economically marginalized? (Boelstorff 2011). And last but not least, the fields of Communications and Media Studies raise other types of questions, such as: What role do our bodies and our senses play in our engagement with various media forms and technologies? How do we interact with them, how do they affect the fabric of our daily life and our experience with our body and the bodies of others?

At this point it is worth noting that I am less interested in taking advantage of the preceding series of interrogations, and more concerned with the sites where we witness the fluidity of bodies and their capacity to affect and be affected. In a radical temporal shift, this conception goes back to the seventeenth century, above all, to the Spinozan philosophy of the modes of bodies, which begins with the question: What can the body do?

Against the Cartesian separation between res cogitans and res extensa—the dualistic view that dominated the modern conception of the body—I am interested in current interpretations that overcome mind/body binarism and other reductionist oppositions. Studies of literary and scientific cultures and of literary figures have important non-Cartesian “readings” of the body. Nowadays these kinds of investigations are widespread. Nevertheless I wish to mention a particularly beautiful example, which articulates holistic thinking on the body in seventeenth-century French literature and contemporary psychological theory. Psychosomatic Disorders, a book by Bernadette Höfer, gives voice to those bodies and subjects whose ability to speak of the nature of their suffering was

8 See the multi-sited and multi-located investigation on organs-trafficking in Schepher-Hughes (2010; 2013).
hampered by the dualistic mind/body model which permeated cultural representations of melancholy, hypochondria, raging fever, and demonic possession.

In her emphasis on the different modes of the body, Höfer discusses a body/self passing through sensual, verbal, emotional and rational modes at the same time. Her stress is on the interpenetration of discourses (spiritual, scientific, medical and holistic) of the period, which underlines the power of certain “bad” passions to hurt bodies (and minds). Höfer prefers the term subjective physicality (Höfer 2009, 89) to refer to both the self and its body. This, she argues, follows the theoretical approach favoured by contemporary neurosciences, quoting Damasio’s conception of the brain-mind-body continuum through which changes in body can be understood. Feelings are perceptions of the body related to the topics and themes of thought. The connections between all these are like a looking-glass game (Damasio 2003, 86; Höfer 2009, 90) in which no single element dominates.

The body as an entire corporeality (the flesh, functions, physiology, sensations, feelings, materiality) constitutes just one path within the vast terrain of Body Studies—its lands, environments, languages and their bodies. Documenting the hundreds of contributions from only the past decade obviously exceeds the possibilities of this text, which is more an invitation to cultivate some of the places in this terrain. Nonetheless, before continuing with the surfaces of bodies, upheavals and textures, I will briefly mention one of the contributions from the anthropology of embodiment, where a language for the worlds of embodied experience was produced.

Two of the many articles written by Thomas J. Csordas in the earliest 90’s (Csordas 1990; 2000 [1993]), as well as his compilation about the existential ground for culture (among others, Csordas 1994), have served as a master referent to scholars seeking to better understand both the link and the difference between embodied and incarnate experience. Influenced by the phenomenological work on the broader question of subject-and-world-relation, and on the material implications of the self-other relation (Wood 2011, 75), Csordas recuperated concern for the “thing” of the world, which Merleau-Ponty calls “flesh”. Csordas explores the corporeality and corporealization of the physical body (the body-soma), and simultaneously, the various experiential perceptions of phenomena (Csordas 1994) that intensify the lived world, as discussed in his “Somatic Modes of Attention” (Csordas 2010 [1993]).

9 Without access to this article in English, I quote the Spanish edition for “Somatic Modes of Attention”, originally published in 1993 (Csordas 2010 [1993]).
Beyond the Interdisciplinary: The State of Body Studies in their ‘Hereness’

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EDITORIAL

Social surfaces of bodies

“The majority of human beings have five senses, more or less”, declares Naomi Segal, in a phrase that shapes her study on *Consensuality* and the sense of touch (Segal 2009), which starts out with a revision of the psychoanalyst Bernard Anzieu’s theory of the skin-ego, now a classic in theories on the skin (Anzieu 1989).

In everyday language, the “sixth sense” is a “special” sense commonly attributed to women. However, scientists understand the sixth sense as proprioception, a term coined in 1890 to comprehend the mechanism by which we perceive our body’s movement, weight, position, and the balance of our trunk and limbs. Work on proprioception forms the backdrop of Segal’s scholarship on the multidimensional condition of the body and its consequences, which rethinks sensation and cognition without the separation between feelings and thought. It is from here that Segal’s notion of *consensuality* emerges, which understands the skin’s perceptions within the circuitry of sensation and thought (Segal 2009).

Many philosophers, departing from the Cartesian notion of the body’s inability to confirm its existence, are instead interested in the place of body in the history of medicine, beginning with what we might call the “somatic thinkers” from William James to the contemporary Peter Sloterdijk (and of course, Foucault and Deleuze). A considerable number of these thinkers situate their work on the side of *res extensa* of that modern Cartesian dualism. Among them, Michel Serres is particularly notable.

Written in 1985, Serres’s *Philosophy of the Mingled Bodies*, whose principal title is *The Five Senses*, was finally published in English only a few years ago in a long-overdue translation (Serres 2008). In his heterodox approach, Serres combines philosophy of science and outstanding work on mathematics with the expressive rhythm of literature in order to describe the human multisensual world, in which the five senses, rooted in the Aristotelian theory of the human sensorium or common sense, interact with and constitute the corporeal surface of the body. For Serres, human perception is mainly “haptic”: senses are not merely receptors of information, but participants in a continuously unfolding process with that which they sense. Nowadays the term “haptics” appears frequently in the titles of a thousand of scientific articles and papers while, around

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10 As emotions are composed of cognitions and thoughts, they can be seen as dynamic assemblages “assenting to or embracing a way of seeing” and “forms of evaluative judgment” of the way things really are. Nussbaum uses a remarkable combination of advanced research from psychology and anthropology, in order to argue that emotions-cognitions are ways of registering how things are with respect to the external items that we view as salient for our well-being (Nussbaum 2001; Nussbauman 2008, 40 and 42).
1994, according to some estimations from scholars in the haptics field,\textsuperscript{11} there were just a dozen references to the term (Hayward et al. 2004, 16). Serres’ book initiated a major shift in the way scholars investigate the senses: Rather than read the signs and symptoms of bodies, Serres insisted on exploring what humans could redescribe, feel and know from haptic perception and the horizon of sounds, noises, and acoustic interferences in the daily world. In an interview from 1987, Serres commented why, in his sequence of senses, vision came last: “Since the vision sense has deserve a preeminent site which in reality it has not, I would rather mention it through the use of a wordily combination. Instead of referring vision, I would say (in French visitation) to visit and to take a look meanwhile walking on a place. To visit here means the participation of the entire body in the act of knowing, experimenting in a visual space” (Serres and Rouy 1987; trans. MAI).

We are no longer centred selves with an ultimate inner “core” (as some identity-politics based definitions of “gender” maintain). Neither do we believe that identities, which appear in the social surface, contain an abiding interior depth (Butler 1997, 14). In other words: there is no “material body” prior to representation, prior to the symbolic machines of the entire cultural system. Nevertheless, the biological base of bodies is under question more than ever before from the standpoint of the limitless nature of identity.

Taking into account lived experience generates more complex conceptions of the body. The body itself, a material, fragile, and mysterious force, is related to our schema of the senses, to embodiment, subjectivity, meanings of life, and to the discourses of the sciences—the individuation of organs and genitalia in investigations done in medicine, natural history, medical anthropology, biology, social sciences, biopsychology, cultural frameworks, and so on, which are rethinking the human in relation with the living. The body is also a border zone, where it is traversed, and in some sense occupied, by psychological, physical, and emotional changes. The body experiences suffering, displacements, traumatic events, loss, and depersonalization. It is the ground for disputes about abortion, stem-cell investigation, euthanasia, human cloning, and the biological determination of gender. Fully-fledged research programmes focus on previously unaddressed areas of vulnerability, such as lived suffering, organs trafficking, organs trafficking, organs trafficking, organs trafficking,

\textsuperscript{11} From the Greek \textit{háptō}, haptics has nowadays a standardized definition, referring to “the capacity to sense the natural and synthetic mechanical environment through touch” (Hayward, Oliver, Cruz-Hernandez et al., 2004,16). The field of haptics is focused on the study of touch, sexuality, tactile therapy, and nonverbal communications. It also includes kinesthesia, and the proprioceptive techniques that enable us to distinguish between the senses, as well as haptic technologies (robotics, intelligent machines, prosthesis, sensory dispositive and interfaces).
the bodies of youth, people in process of changing gender/sex, transsexuality, intersexuality, newborns with ambiguous genitalia, and so on.\footnote{12 One might turn to the blogosphere for numerous valuable texts about the intersectionality and vulnerability of transbodies (Gavroche 2014).}

The openness of the body to novel experiences goes hand in hand with the kinds of “persons” who inhabit bodies, who how their bodies behave in their immediate surroundings. Faced with the open seascape or the saturated landscape of the city, people in their movement or immobility know if they are, or are not, out of place. In other words, people immediately grasp if the others they meet, interact and communicate with, are friendly, honest, repulsive—or if “being close” means, in fact, a moral, racial, classist, or ethical distance. When people are faced with these issues in their embodied lives, they perceive corporeally whether they are right, whether there is balance or justice in their assessments (Thrift 1996, 9). Being a body, being embodied and incarnate, after all, is a condition-to-be-in-the-world—ways of experience that participate in the inside/outside movement of the ego and its object-relations, which involve proprioceptive feelings. Maybe someday we will use just one word for tasting, hearing, smelling, touching and so forth. Perhaps this is what Anzieu’s term “skin-ego” really means.

The skin, with its tactile senses, performs a variety of functions (pertaining to dermatopic sensitivity, touch, response to pain, distinguishing between hot and cold), bringing in outside information and matching it with visual and auditory data—activities all vital to so-called ‘common sense’ (sensorium) (Anzieu 1989, 105). Thinkers of the skin are discovering and theorizing our abilities to register sensory remains on the surface; some argue for the existence of ten senses, including new varieties of touch, the already mentioned kinesics capacities, and proprioception (Segal 2009, 1). The newest proposals on the skin debate suggest a new series of categories for understanding the body’s movement. For example the French term expéusition [in Spanish, expielación] introduced by Jean-Luc Nancy (Nancy 2003) combines the word “skin” [peau] and the prefix “ex” to signify being-exposed in its ex-istence, i.e. the skin as a point, as the starting point of the body (Serres has similar expression: “the soul inhabits in the quasi-point where the ‘I’ is determined” (2008, 21).

The theoretical and political movements emphasizing the importance of difference, ‘the difference of difference’, coming from a variety of research communities and focusing on a wide range of issues, paved the way for new elaborations and theorizations of the body. This is a widespread achievement that has forged common, shared principles in Body Studies. Among the long list of theorizations and its “turns” which we can attribute to the emphasis on “difference”
include studies of racialization, the already-mentioned co-presence of sensation and thought, and subjectivization. In the US, radical feminism and postcolonial studies investigated the whiteness of racialized society, posing questions such as “What does positing one’s writerly self unraced [...] and all others as raced entail?” (to mention a very famous quotation from the African-American writer Toni Morrison (1993, xii)). Morrison’s words still ring true wherever we find a cultural supremacy that does not associate black/indigenous people, or the racial “other”, with ideas. Thus there has been a push to reclaim silenced voices and bodies, and to generate theories on autobiography, testimony, autoethnography, and more, from fields such literary theory, sociology, anthropology, and so on, in order to inquire into the role of subjectivity in narrative, poetic, and historical writing, and in the various forms of social action (Carver 2003, 24 and 27). According to these frameworks, to reclaim the voices and bodies that have been silenced has needed a different practice of writing and telling the own stories beyond the authoritative self of “the third person who masks the first person”. A stronger subjectivity in writing emerges from an autobiography “that reads more like an outsider looking in, rather than an insider looking out.” (Carver 2003, 18)

Curiously, these approaches overlapped with socio-anthropological perspectives on colour-line hierarchies and racisms in the conflicting legacy of white dominance and colonial imaginaries. Of course, the skin is not just a surface or the “outside” of pre-existing inscriptions, even if “the skin is produced and reproduced through inscriptions” (Kay 2012, 456). Yet from a cultural point of view there is a connection between making legible marks on the body, and the skin constituted for such a purpose; and also between the skin as a surface to be read (symptom), and the fact that writing on skin renders possible legibility (Kay 2012, 458). Since the very beginning the Law was written on the surface of the body to turn it into a bearer of stigma (Nussbaum 2006, 205-260). It is worth mentioning here the long history of extreme practices of damage in bodily regimes, such as defacement in systems of slavery.

**Body-Subject/Bodily Subjectivization**

Alongside the study of subaltern corporealities, the concept of the “subject-body” (which cannot be reduced to either of its parts) has made a big impact on theories of subjectivization. The body is no longer an intimate occupation of the subject but a “[...] matière multiple et inerte sur laquelle viendrait s’appliquer, contre laquelle viendrait frapper le pouvoir, qui soumettrait les
Individus ou les briserait\textsuperscript{13} (Foucault 1997, 38), thus there is a wiser and more radical interpretation of Foucauldian thesis about “le pouvoir [... qui] transite ou translume par notre corps\textsuperscript{14}” (Foucault 1997, 27). One may say that such theories have recovered the ambivalent sense of the French word \textit{assujetissement}\textsuperscript{15}.

During the end of the eighties and early nineties in Latin America, Foucault’s late interest in the “care of the self” was reshaped within poststructuralist frameworks, also interesting feminist thinkers, who insisted on theorizing agency and the body as a private space (like the household) upon which public law applies a gendered and sexed authority. The importance of taking seriously the problem of the “woman’s body” gained support, constituting a “rupture épistémologique” of the body’s masculine, dominative inheritance. Nonetheless the dignity of the body and of “personhood”, its peer concept, will continue to necessitate radical critique, so long as both of them (the juridical definition of ‘person’ in opposition to the ‘living body’) converge in those contemporary spheres of life over which (bio)politics has domain.

One aspect of Foucault’s research deals with the bodies of the hysteric, the pervert and the criminal, all of them figures that appear in the discursive microcultures of moral economy, excavated by Foucault during his painstaking work in the archives. Another aspect of Foucault’s research focuses on the “self” that resides in, and is generated by, the knowledge-power matrix and the institutional organization of contemporary societies. One might say that today, the intensification of the self is everywhere, with so many ramifications for the study of the body that we simply lack the space to properly recapitulate this important canon and its implications for gay and lesbian movements, queer and trans-studies and the biopolitical body. Each of these areas has offered a different take on the body, both at it is inscribed by normative culture and as it becomes a site of resistance. Bodily matters, Foucault has taught us, are constantly consolidating and/or subverting social forms.

Combining informal interviews and seminars with his formal courses at the Collège de France, Foucault created a \textit{mise-en-scéne} for the “self”. His Fall course of 1981-1982 was dedicated to the hermeneutics of the subject, in English entitled “The Care for the Self as a Practice of Freedom” (Foucault 1988) [the French original was published as \textit{L’Herméneutique du Sujet} (Foucault 1984, 99-116). In this course Foucault dealt with the rise (in Foucault’s words, “emergence”) of the

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{13} inert and multiple matter where the power will be applied, matter which will be striked by the power. This one will subdue or shatter the individuals.
\item \textsuperscript{14} power [... which] travels or migrates through our bodies.
\item \textsuperscript{15} To be a subject means to be subjugated to (the sovereign form of power) and become subject of.
present, analyzing the relationship between social positioning and subjectivity, which moves from the modern symbolic and material order to processes of self-construction. These processes relate to transmitted forms of behaviour, conducts and daily routines, from table manners, ways of being, doing and acting, to gestures and body postures, and even emotive dimensions. In an interview, Foucault described his research as an attempt to understand the relations between the subject and the truth games that take the shape of science, institutions and controls, what he called the “exercise and training of oneself” by which one tries to elaborate, transform and accede to a certain way of being (Foucault 1984, 94).

There was little room, or perhaps not enough, for cultural translations of this encapsulated but experiential *mode of the body*, which Michel Foucault adopted from the ancient Greek notion *chrēsis* [use]:

16 “to designate the, in a certain way singular, transcendental passion, of the subject in regards to what surrounds him/her, with the objects available to him/her, and also with those others with he/she is connected, with his/her own body and, in the end, with oneself” (Foucault 1996 [1984], 47). Although the term was initially related to the normative life of the citizen who uses properly his/her body, more recently this notion of “use” has acquired other meanings, as for example in Giorgio Agamben’s genealogy. *The Use of Bodies*, the title of Agamben’s last book in his *Homo Sacer* series, introduces a much wider semantic history for the term “use”. Agamben traces “the use of the body” from the Aristotelian reference, to the slave body, to early Christian theology, in order to find the political meaning of the “common use” of the body [in Spanish: *uso común del cuerpo*] and her/his/its parts and organs. The instrumentalization of the “use” of the body reaches its zenith just in time for the complete transformation of *capitalism as religion*. Here Walter Benjamin figures prominently in Agamben’s emphasis on the social order (Agamben 2007, 105 and 106), which captures the entire time-space continuum of living human bodies, turning their lives into vectors of guilt as their activity and inactivity become focused on a daily sacrifice, without redemption, for tomorrow’s life. In his most profound line of argument, dispersed amongst his various recent works (such as the book *Profanations* (2007)), Agamben argues that this totalizing “use” of our bodies actually entails the body’s disappearance. (This is in accordance with Agamben’s claim that the modern world has extinguished experience, an idea borrowed again from Benjamin.) Agamben illuminates the Janus-faced nature of late capitalism, which he sees as

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16 *Chrēsis* was adopted by Plato and the other ancient Greek philosophers. In addition, the Church Fathers utilized other words that mean “use” (*chrēsis dikaia, usus iustus*) (Gnilka 2006).
defined by consumption and spectacle. Everything exists to be exhibited and consumed (2007, 109). Prior to this moment, all things (alive or dead) lose their right and ability to be in use because of their separation from the lived and common world. It is thus their impossibility to be used that converts things or bodies into a condition of “inoperativity” (a key concept from Agamben regarding to his conception on *The Use of Bodies*).

Later contributions to the theory of the subject follow Foucault’s paradox of subjectivization (underlined by the double meaning of the term “subject”), arguing that the inherent ambivalence of meaning is linked to the experience of becoming a subject (Das 2007, 59). These theories place emphasis upon the space of “the unsayable” and the outside of foreclosure (a Lacanian concept), which persists as the constitutive specter of its own destabilization (Butler 1993, 190; 204). Judith Butler’s work, especially *Bodies That Matter* (1993) and *Psychic Life of Power* (1997), analyzes the interactions of performativity and subjectivity (or the threefold analysis of subjection, according to Butler 1997, 29). Butler examines these issues from a psychoanalytic, linguistic model, in which the failure of the signifier to adequately represent a signified — the inherent loss generated by the processes of signification — creates a space of de-signification. The process of becoming-subject is phantasmatic: while there is a certain exclusion that founds the subject, such foreclosure is never fully successful, it is always a performance that returns. Thus, as Sara Mahmood points out in *Politics of Piety*, bodily practices create a subject in their performativity, and at the same time the subject becomes embodied during its processes of formation (Mahmood 2004, 19).

**Bodily projection**

In aesthetic fields (*aiesthesis*) and artistic practices, which are inherently more familiar with the kinesthetic connections of bodies and which participate in various trainings and therapies for bodily enhancement, the body is understood as

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17 It is important to note that in her classical book of queer theory (Butler 1993), Butler makes use of various psychoanalytic concepts to understand the work of subjectivation. On the one hand, her understanding of fantasy, derived from Laplanche and Pontalis’ previous work on the origins of sexuality, is characterized by “the scene of unrecoverable loss through which the subject is dispersed between the autoerotic pull of need and desire, positioning the subject itself, in fantasy, as both object and desire” (Murray 1997, 10). On the other hand, foreclosure, the Lacanian concept which emerged to designate a specific psychotic mechanism in which operates the rejection of primordial signifier, is expelled from the symbolic realm of the subject, but at the same time, it always returns in hallucinatory or delirious forms in the Real. These “returns” are felt as intrusions into language and the perceptive dimension of the subject.
an assemblage. These areas have an affinity with vitalist thought, topological theories, and a Deleuzean, immanent conception of life as a force that traverses living subjects. “Too often,” writes Mannig, “life is conceived as the limit where the body expresses itself as already individuated, but the body cannot hold life without life undoing it at the edges” (2010, 115). It is at these liminal points where a life—according to the performance theorist Erin Manning, quoting the sociologist Gilbert Simondon—“conserves the ontogenetic force (...) activating life’s incipiency in a creative de-phasing where the body is never One.” Thus, life force is indeed “the life of the collective, the plurality of becomings” (2010, 119).

Given the scope of this article, it is not possible to give a further account of the many implications of Deleuzian theory for body studies. Nonetheless, it is worth mentioning Felix Guattari and Gilles Deleuze’s critiques of Western thought, centered on the problems of recognition and representation. The publications of their *Anti-Oedipus* (1984 [1972]) and *A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia* (1987 [1980]) broke new ground in their attempts to develop nonrepresentational thought and to continue the post-Marxian critique of contemporary capitalism by examining processes of de/re-territorialization.

To summarize briefly, Deleuzian thought stresses the immanent process of becoming. This idea was radically embraced by the French poet Antonin Artaud, who opposed to the notion of the living body, his concept of the body without organs (BwO), a mere state of forces. The BwO goes beyond the regime of cultural meaning, acting as a continuum of forces, intensities, sensations and affects: “Nothing is known about it if we do not know what it is able to do (...) which are its affects, how they can or not compose with another affects, with another body affects...” (Deleuze and Guattari 1988, 261).

In conclusion, bodies and affects are becomings. Instead of accompanying readings of semiotic contexts, bodies form part of a “complex of interactions”, innumerable rhizomatic strands “that constitute the spaces where they exist and in terms of their inherent worth” (Armitage 2001, 190). The conception of BwO is imbricated in life. Thus the “vital dimension” of BwO is plunged “into the unthought” (Alliez 2004, 93). The body without organs breaks its own organic and organizational boundaries, its intensities and forces founding new readings and practices in art and politics.

Erasing the master-logic of ontological thought, the Deleuzian approach not only reincorporates the tensions between epistemic paradigms, for example between the paradigm of the event and the representational one, but also finds plural paths to displace the traditional rational course of the two approaches to language: those with representational content, and those that relate to the field of experience (Laclau 2000, 118).
Before concluding, we must recall that an *event* (historically speaking) is always ‘*an effect, perfect and beautifully produced by bodies that collide, mix or separate*’, according to the famous idea that inspired Foucault when reading Deleuze’s 1968 work *Repetition and Difference* (Deleuze (1995 [1968])). Additionally, “This ‘effect’—as we must understand it—no longer belongs to the distribution and order of bodies, because, strictly speaking, the effectuation of events does not entail a necessary outlet to order; rather, it disturbs known orders, and engenders new hopes and social beginnings. So, an event, (…) is social *creation* (political of course, and aesthetic), for *creating* ‘brings about the event’ of a holistic understanding of the creation and recreation of (human) life on earth (…), integrated in the cosmos” (Aguiluz-Ibargüen 2013).

In his most recent book, Paul Connerton argues that giving priority to the relationship between bodies and spaces is not just relevant, but urgent (Connerton 2011, 147-172). Connerton explores "bodily projection" as a three-dimensional issue, focusing on the sociospatial co-generation and multi-sited knowledges that make bodies (in plural) part of every hábitat. He proposes three types of bodily projections: emphatic fusion, mimetic articulation, and cosmic projection. From these types emerge a complete cognitive map, a cosmic "key". Connerton’s ecobodily position constitutes not only a new understanding of life, but also a deep commitment to the posthuman, where the sense of life and human life are “embedded in a material world (…), one of which we depend for our continued survival” (Hayles 1999, 5). In *How we Became Posthuman*, Katherine Hayles explores the possibilities of inhabiting a surface, interrogating human culture from the discursive realms of the humanities, cultural studies, paleoanthropology, and anthropology. In doing so, she creates a history of the “sedimented body” (Hayles 1999): a resistant materiality whose resistance includes the way in which discursive systems construct it (Hayles 2010, 329). Beyond apocalyptic narratives of cyberdomination, feminist thinkers like Katherine Hayles, Donna Haraway, and Teresa de Lauretis, though they work from different perspectives, embrace the liaisons or fusions between bodies and technologies, assuming a realistic position regarding contemporary societies of control and biopower. Unlike Haraway and Lauretis, whose work is more well-known, Hayles’ contribution stresses the possibilities for encounters from literary fields, the imaginary dimension to cognition, the technogenesis of the posthuman, and the modes of reading defined by digital culture, with its information-intense environments and its effects on brain adaptation and neural plasticity (2010, 329). Thus, we can see Connerton’s first type of body projection, the “empathic fusion”, represented in Hayles’ work, as “she has a fully equivocal conception of the technological posthuman, understanding both its dangers and possibilities” (Kroker 2013),
including the consequences that this might have for the corporeal attributes of our bodies.

However, Connerton’s second dimension of bodily projection, mimetic articulation, is more commonly observed, because it pertains to the relationship between bodily attributes and the social imaginaries of bodies. In fact, it is for this reason that so many histories have been told, and are still to be told, and in my own view (following Csordas and others) the problem to the so named “body language” is that has been understood from a linguistic frame, which its rationality is based in representational premises.

The anthropologist Csordas’s (2008) work on embodiment, experience and intercorporeality seeks also to reconfigure phenomenological approaches to the body-subject from the world of embodied experience. Csordas’s argues that embodied experience is not structurally analogous to intersubjectivity; hence, he prefers to think of a wordless “intercorporeality”, in order to avoid the misleading analogy between nonverbal languages (such as body language) and verbal ones. This confusion would not be resolved if we used the term “communication” to refer to the nonverbal in contrast to “language”, because such a distinction presumes it can analyze different processes of signification. While nonverbal communication presumably attends to “codes”, language focuses our attention on “grammar, or the system”, which would conclude in confusing two different processes by dealing with them “in parallel by means of parallel methods” (Csordas 2008, 114). In order to avoid this complicated problem, Csordas introduces a new conception of nonverbal language as the “Other language”, in which there is a mimetic aspect that transforms language itself into a medium that is not about perception, but rather generates similarities to human capacities (Csordas 2008, 115). This semiotic feature of language (following Benjamin) finds its complementary element in the human capacity to manifest bodily perceptions throughout “the mute”, “the speech”, and “the sonorous”, which brings up (following in this respect Merleau-Ponty’s The Visible and the Invisible) “an almost carnal existence of the idea”, a “sublimation of the flesh” (2008, 118). Before the immediacy of phenomena like “intercorporeality”, it is useful to think the medium of language sometimes failed to access to the worlds of the inter-corporeal, and others kinds of experiences propelled by touch and feeling, understanding the course of “carnalizing language” and comprehending its immediacy, i.e. intercorporeal immediacy (118).

To conclude this topic, it is worth mentioning Connerton’s third bodily projection, “cosmic projection”, as another ‘inside-out’/outside-in’ movement of the body (Glanville and Varela 1981). This type of bodily projection can be found within philosophical reflection (knowledge) and practices of knowledge.

With his goal of rethinking the key philosophical questions suspended by
Western thought, such as the significance of community and “being with” [mit-sein], the original work of Jean-Luc Nancy, one of the major living philosophers, advances the critique of “closure metaphysics” (whose previous critics include Nietzsche, Heidegger, Deleuze, Derrida, and so forth). Nancy’s work adheres to “the extremity of reason in an excess of and above reason itself” (Kotsko 2005, 90). His thought may be better understood as a template for philosophical work as such: rather than study the images and representations of the world, Nancy’s philosophical manner of interrogation (as well as the way he reads literature, scientific research, and cultural criticism) corresponds to “an opening [an un-close]\(^\text{18}\) of significance, an opening which might be for all time renovated.” [As Nancy said in a recent interview] “Philosophy is the understanding that there is no an ultimate sense’ (Nancy 2012; Martí-Jufresa and Basinals 2012).

This idea takes on particular significance when considering Nancy’s own biography. In his essay “The Intrus”, Nancy gives an account of his difficult experience of heart surgery and post-surgical recovery. In this text, he conceives of a kind of body which is “in-between”; intruded by strangers’ bodies, by the artifacts and biotechnologies which are inside us all.

Beyond phenomenological concepts such as “lived experience” or “corporeality”, in his Corpus Nancy examines the sensorial body, whose ability to enunciate cannot be encapsulated by the significations of language. “Of course, the body also enunciates in language: there is the mouth, tongue, muscles, vibrations, frequencies, or even hands, keys, graphical symbols, traces, and all the messages are endless chains of stamps and material grafts. But it is precisely that: we are no longer concerned with the message of the language, but with its exscription” (Nancy 2003, 87; trans. MAI)

In his Corpus, Nancy speaks from every line, repeating sounds as if they were exercises in vocalization; the text draws, smells, touches. One feels a “being-with” the physicality of the book. The same thing happens when being with other bodies, which generates bodily mediation, in-between subjectivities, and bodily place. Bodies, after all, are vital forces, also (im)material. This is well known among the yatiris from South American worlds, who provide testimony

\(^{18}\) In his review of Nancy’s La Déclosion: Déconstruction du christianisme, 1 (Nancy 2005), Adam Kotsko explains: “the word déclosion stands in contrast with closion or clôture, as an un-closing or de-closing -tearing down the wall, opening the cloistening [... ] However, découlson is contrasted also with éclosion, a word referring literally to “hatching” and used to signify breaking through a barrier into a wider world (as in the example of ... space exploration). For Nancy, the world has reached a point where no further éclosion is possible, and so we are entering into a phase of déclosion, ‘the éclosion of éclosion itself.’” (Nancy 2005, 230; Kostko 2005, 89 and 95)
of the body’s openness: one’s body is settled in motion, is walking, like the wind [“wayra hina purishan”, in quechua language; (un cuerpo que) ‘va caminando como el viento...’]:

“[…] Como el viento no más será pues, como el viento siempre. Nadie podría verlo, no tiene color, ni se sabe como es, no se sabe si es pequeño o grandecito. Solamente es pues como el viento, como el aliento, es aircito no más”.

“[…] Wayrahinachallachá kakushan riki, wayrahinallapuniyá. Manayá rikunikmanchu pipas, manan kanchu [color], ni imayna kasqan, ni huch’uycha ni hatuncha kasqan animuqa riki, solamenteqa wayra-hinalla, samayhinachallachá kashan riki, airechalla riki kashan”

Saturnino Mamani 19

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