BANK RUNS IN PRACTICE AND THEORY
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Abstract
The paper shows that past bank run episodes in the United States display a common pattern. Runs are endogenous to situations of perceived insolvency concerns resulting from the adoption of risky practices driven by the profit motive within a context of lose/inadequate regulation or deregulation. Risky practices make financial institutions more vulnerable to changes in external conditions. The mainstream approaches to bank runs are based on a characterization of an economy that resembles a cooperative economy (all resources are shared equally by all participants) rather than an entrepreneur economy whose end-motive is profit making. As a result, they provide implausible stories about bank runs. Building on the stylized facts of bank runs this paper presents the main building blocks for an alternative theory.
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