Citizen Support for the Judicial Elections in Mexico: Legitimacy, Partisanship and Democratic Values

Abstract

Within the framework of Mexico’s 2024 judicial reform, this study examines why Mexican citizens tend to prefer the popular election of judges rather than merit-based appointment processes. Drawing on the literature on judicial elections—developed primarily from the subnational cases of the United States and the national experience of Bolivia—this analysis uses data from the 2024 Fourth National Survey of Public Opinion, a nationally representative, face-to-face survey conducted by ISA. Quasibinomial logistic regression models were estimated to assess structural, informational, and ideological factors associated with attitudes toward judicial elections. Findings indicate that support for judicial elections is positively associated with presidential approval (both for Andrés Manuel López Obrador and Claudia Sheinbaum Pardo), support for democracy, and social welfare programs. Conversely, valuing the technical expertise of judges and displaying greater political interest reduce the likelihood of supporting such elections. Presidential approval of Sheinbaum emerges as a consistent predictor. In addition, independent voters, higher-income groups, and those who perceive corruption within the judiciary show greater support for the reform, whereas individuals identifying as Indigenous tend to oppose it. Although limited public knowledge about the reform and subsequent low turnout may constrain its democratic legitimacy, it is noteworthy that Mexico represents the world’s first national case in which both federal and state judiciaries are fully elected through popular vote. This provides a novel empirical setting to test theories of democratic legitimacy and symbolic representation. Overall, citizen support for judicial elections appears heterogeneous but seems to depend more on political alignments, material benefits, and democratic values than on the institutional design itself.